






















The	 paper	 examines	 the	 relationship	 between	 Euroscepticism	 and	 ideology	 in	
Western	European	countries	and	focuses	on	how	this	relationship	is	mediated	by	
party	 system	 characteristics	 and	 partisanship.	 Additionally,	 we	 explore	 some	
distinctive	 national	 patterns	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	 Euroscepticism	 and	
ideology	by	focusing	on	four	South	European	countries	(Portugal,	Spain,	Italy,	and	
Greece),	 which	 despite	 their	 similar	 historical	 and	 social	 trajectories,	 as	 well	 as	
common	 experiences	 during	 the	 euro	 crisis	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 other	 Western	
European	nations,	they	deviate	in	different	ways	from	the	European-wide	pattern	
of	interaction	between	ideology	and	Euroscepticism.	Using	data	from	the	European	
Election	 Study	 of	 2014	 and	 the	 Chapel	 Hill	 Expert	 Survey,	 we	 show	 that	 the	
relationship	 between	 ideology	 and	 Euroscepticism	 can	 be	 heavily	 influenced	 by	
characteristics	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 party	 system,	 such	 as	 degree	 of	 party	 system	
polarization	and	the	levels	of	supply	of	left-wing	and	right-wing	Euroscepticism,	as	
well	 as	 individual	 party	 legacies	 that	 can	 filter	 the	 ideology-Euroscepticism	
relationship	 through	 the	 influence	 of	 partisanship.	 Our	 findings	 highlight	 the	
importance	 of	 parties	 and	 party	 leadership	 in	 the	 future	 development	 of	





























competition	 is	 increasingly	 structured	by	 a	diversity	 of	 policy	 issues	 rather	 than	
long-established	 cleavages.	 Besides	 the	 growing	 importance	 of	 some	 non-




To	 a	 large	 extent,	 this	 adaptation	 has	 concerned	 negative	 attitudes	 towards	 the	
European	 Union	 (EU),	 which	 have	 expanded	 significantly	 over	 the	 last	 decades,	




EU	 and	 the	 integration	 process.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 position	 of	 parties	 on	
European	 issues	 has	 become	 increasingly	 diversified.	 While	 most	 mainstream	
parties	have	usually	shown	pro-EU	positions,	during	the	crisis	it	can	be	seen	that	
even	 moderate	 parties	 present	 more	 critical	 views,	 with	 some	 divergences	
emerging	in	critical	ways.	On	the	other,	the	salience	of	the	EU	has	increased	at	the	







the	center	are	 least	Eurosceptic,	while	people	on	 the	 far	right/left	are	somewhat	
more	 Eurosceptic.	 However,	 a	 recent	 study	 shows	 that,	 despite	 their	 common	
rejection	 of	 the	 European	 integration,	 parties	 and	 voters	 at	 the	 extremes	 of	 the	
ideological	 continuum	present	distinct	 critiques	 towards	 the	EU	 (van	Elsas	 et	 al.	
2016).	 This	 means	 that	 the	 content	 and	 motivations	 of	 ‘radical’	 Euroscepticism	
differ	and	these	differences	depend	on	the	specific	EU	dimension	under	study.	 In	
particular,	 left-wing	 citizens	 present	 higher	 levels	 of	 dissatisfaction	with	 the	 EU	










of	 further	 integration	 -	 is	 confined	 to	 the	 left	 of	 the	 ideological	 spectrum	 in	
Portugal,	while	 in	other	countries	(e.g.	 Italy)	criticism	is	mainly	based	on	rightist	
positions?	This	paper	addresses	 this	 issue	by	 relying	on	data	 from	the	European	
Election	Study	(EES)	and	the	Chapel	Hill	Expert	Survey	(CHES),	which	allow	us	to	
consider	 the	 relationship	 between	 ideology	 and	 Euroscepticism	 taking	 into	





despite	 the	 growing	 levels	 of	 Eurosceptic	 attitudes	 in	 the	 crisis-ridden	 Europe,	
Eurosceptic	parties	have	not	always	benefited	from	this	shift	in	public	opinion.	The	
strategy	 of	 party	 leadership	 and	 party	 system	 characteristics	 play	 an	 important	
role	 in	 shaping	 distinct	 trajectories.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 new	 or	 extremist	 parties	
have	 been	 successful	 in	 politicizing	 the	 European	 issue	 only	 when	 mainstream	
parties	 have	 converged	 on	 pro-integration	 positions.	 On	 the	 other,	 in	 some	
countries,	while	 the	structure	of	political	opportunity	provided	 fertile	ground	for	
this	politicization,	extremist	parties	have	not	benefited	from	public	concern	about	
EU	 integration.	 For	 example,	 the	 (Eurosceptic)	 radical	 right	 did	 not	 make	 any	
inroads	into	the	national	party	systems	of	Ireland,	Portugal	or	Spain,	whereas	the	
far	 left	was	 incapable	 to	gain	any	ground	 in	Austria,	Belgium	and	Germany.	This	
structural	variation	points	to	the	need	to	understand	how	the	convergence	(or	lack	





to	 preferences	 in	 the	 electorate	 but	 that	 the	 causal	 arrow	 runs	 in	 the	 opposite	
direction	 as	 well.	 	 Historical	 national	 patterns	 of	 political	 supply	 and	 the	
ideological	 legacies	 of	 parties	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 Europe	 condition	 patterns	 of	
preference	formation	at	the	level	of	the	electorate	within	national	polities,	due	to	
the	 fact	 that	 Euroscepticism	 is	 bound	 to	 party	 identities	 and	must	 fit	 the	 raison	
d’être	 of	 partisan	 core	 values.	 Overall	 this	 research	 complements	 the	 dominant	













the	 issue	 of	 European	 integration.	 In	 the	 second,	 we	 investigate	 specific	 case	
studies	 (Greece,	 Italy,	 Portugal,	 Spain)	 in	 order	 to	 explore	 causal	 mechanisms	
behind	 the	 distinct	 patterns	 with	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 partisanship.	
Drawing	specifically	on	the	example	of	countries	in	the	South	European	periphery	
involving	 countries	 that	 have	 been	 hard-hit	 by	 the	 economic	 crisis,	 it	 will	 be	




relationship	 to	 the	 left-right	 dimension.	 This	 allows	 us	 to	 derive	 a	 series	 of	











from	 different	 perspectives	 and	 fields	 of	 study.	 As	 several	 authors	 have	 already	
observed	(Serricchio	et	al.	2013;	Brack	and	Startin	2015),	 the	shift	 from	an	elite-
oriented	 project	 to	 the	 increasing	 involvement	 of	 citizens	 has	 attributed	 more	
relevance	 to	 the	 topic.	More	 recently,	 the	 emergence	 and	 success	 of	 new	 actors	
opposing	the	European	integration	has	raised	deep	concerns	on	the	future	of	the	
EU	and	the	divorce	between	EU	political	elites	and	voters.	
Euroscepticism	 has	 been	 traditionally	 defined	 as	 ‘contingent	 or	 qualified	
opposition,	 as	 well	 as	 incorporating	 outright	 and	 unqualified	 opposition	 to	 the	
process	 of	 European	 integration’	 (Taggart	 1998:	 366).	 The	 literature	 has	
emphasized	 the	 complex	 nature	 of	 Euroscepticism	 and	 has	 deepened	 our	
understanding	 of	 this	 phenomenon	by	 disentangling	 several	 dimensions	 (Mudde	
2011;	 Serricchio	 et	 al.	 2013).	 From	 this	 viewpoint,	 conventional	 wisdom	 on	
Euroscepticism	 has	 traditionally	 distinguished	 ‘political’	 vs	 ‘instrumental’	
Euroscepticism.	While	the	first	dimension	focuses	on	the	reduction	of	sovereignty	




of	 the	 nation-state	 in	 deciding	 on	 certain	 policy	 domains,	 the	 second	 gives	
emphasis	 on	 the	 benefits	 one	 member	 state	 receives	 from	 belonging	 to	 the	 EU	
(Anderson	 1998;	 Anderson	 and	 Reichert	 1996;	 Boomgarden	 et	 al.	 2011;	 Deflem	
and	 Pampel	 1996;	 Eichenberg	 and	Dalton	 1993;	Hooghe	 and	Marks	 2005,	 Gabel	
1998a,	1998b;	Mahler	et	al.	2000;	Marsh	1999;	McLaren	2006;	Steenbergen	et	al.	
2007).		
The	 empirical	 studies	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 left-right	 divide	 and	
Euroscepticism	 has	 provided	 inconsistent	 findings.	 Traditionally,	 Euroscepticism	
has	 been	 modelled	 as	 a	 curvilinear	 function	 of	 voters’	 left-right	 placement	
(Steenbergen	 et	 al.	 2007;	 Lubbers	 and	 Scheepers	 2010).	 However,	 other	 studies	
have	found	that	left-wing	parties	are	less	skeptical	towards	the	EU	(Ladrech	2000;	
Tsebelis	and	Garrett	2000;	Hix	et	al.	2007;	McLaren	2007).	According	to	the	well-
known	 theory	 of	 ‘party-based’	 Euroscepticism	 (Taggart	 and	 Szczerbiak	 2004;	
Hooghe	and	Marks	2005),	 voters’	 attitudes	 towards	 the	EU	are	associated	 to	 the	
stances	 taken	 by	 political	 parties	 on	 this	 issue.	 Consequently,	 according	 to	 this	
theory	we	expect	 to	 find	a	differential	 impact	of	 ideology	on	Euroscepticism,	one	
that	is	contingent	upon	the	psychological	ties	of	 individuals	to	particular	political	
parties.	 One	 would	 also	 expect	 to	 see	 sudden	 and	 deep	 changes	 in	 voters’	
perception	of	the	EU	integration	process	during	the	crisis.	This	fact	is	due	not	only	
to	 the	 negative	 impact	 of	 economic	 performance2,	 but	 also	 on	 the	 increasing	
distrust	 in	 national	 institutions,	 which	 is	 positively	 related	 to	 Euroscepticism	
(Anderson	1998;	McLaren	2007).	
Existing	 research	 has	 shown	not	 only	 that	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 EU	 vary	 across	
countries,	 but	 also	 that	 they	 show	 different	 patterns	 over	 time	 (Lubbers	 and	
Scheepers	2010).	From	a	dynamic	point	of	view,	neither	economic	indicators	nor	
the	 stances	 adopted	 by	 political	 parties	 seem	 to	 be	 important	 determinants	 to	
trends	 in	Euroscepticism	 (Lubbers	 and	 Scheepers	 2010).	As	 far	 as	 the	 impact	 of	
the	left-right	divide	is	concerned,	these	scholars	found	that	its	effect	is	contingent	
upon	 the	 context,	 i.e.	 the	 effect	 on	 Euroscepticism	 is	 positive	 for	 contributor	
countries,	 while	 for	 those	 countries	 benefiting	 most	 from	 the	 EU	 budget	 the	
traditional	 U-shaped	 pattern	 is	 found,	 meaning	 that	 Euroscepticism	 is	 more	
frequent	on	the	far	right	and	far	left	of	the	political	spectrum.	Most	of	this	variation	
is	 accounted	 for	 individual-level	 variables,	 but	 extant	 research	 fail	 to	 take	 into	
account	variables	related	to	the	party	system.		
Other	 studies	 have	 also	 emphasized	 the	 fluid	 nature	 of	 party-based	
Euroscepticism,	 both	 over	 time	 and	 across	 policy	 dimensions.	 Even	 from	 the	
functional	point	of	view,	the	fact	that	the	right-wing	has	showed	an	unconditional	
                                                
2	See	in	particular,	socio-economic	explanations	(e.g.	Eichenberg	and	Dalton	1993)	and	‘egocentric	
utilitarianism’	 (e.g.	 Gabel	 1998;	 Gabel	 and	 Hix	 1997).	 For	 a	 review	 on	 the	 determinants	 of	
Euroscepticism	see	Loveless	and	Rohrschneider	(2011).	
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opposition	 to	 the	 EU	 presents	 substantial	 variance,	 with	 numerous	 exceptions	
across	countries	and	at	different	points	in	time	(Conti	and	Memoli	2012).	A	recent	
study	has	also	confirmed	the	changing	evolution	of	Euroscepticism,	showing	that	
party	positions	 are	now	 influenced	by	 stances	on	 social	 issues,	while	 in	 the	past	
economic	 issues	 were	 mainly	 responsible	 for	 party	 support	 towards	 European	
integration	(Prosser	2016).	
Why	do	distinct	patterns	of	the	relationship	between	left-right	and	Euroscepticism	
emerge	 across	 Europe?	 As	 a	 number	 of	 works	 have	 shown,	 the	 way	 ideology	




the	 problem	 of	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 nation-state	 has	 definitively	 gained	more	
traction	 after	 the	 eurocrisis,	 when	 several	 countries	 had	 to	 follow	 the	 rules	
imposed	by	external	 actors,	 among	which	European	 institutions	played	a	 central	
role.	 Although	 this	 is	 one	 of	 the	main	 controversies	 of	 the	 process	 of	 European	
integration	 -	as	 the	referendums	on	the	European	Constitutions	held	 in	 the	early	
21st	 century	 have	 shown	 -,	 the	 politicization	 of	 this	 topic	 in	 some	 countries	 has	
increased	negative	perceptions	of	EU	institutions,	which	are	one	key	determinant	
of	Euroscepticism	(McLaren	2007).	This	means	that	differences	between	member	





the	 political	 spectrum	 (Kriesi	 2014;	 Hobolt	 and	 Tilley	 2016).	 The	 emergence	 of	
new	political	 formations	has	widened	 the	political	 space,	making	also	 less	 stable	
and	predictable	previous	patterns	of	electoral	alignment.	
In	our	perspective,	there	are	two	main	factors	that	have	hitherto	been	neglected	in	
the	 studies	 on	 Euroscepticism	 and	 that	 may	 significantly	 improve	 our	
understanding	of	 this	phenomenon.	The	 first	 is	partisanship,	while	 the	 second	 is	
party	system	polarization.	Both	factors	are	related	not	only	to	the	legacy	of	mass-
party	 linkages,	 but	 also	 to	 the	 structural	 alignments	 that	 have	 shaped	 party	
competition	 over	 EU	 politics.	 The	 underlying	 idea	 is	 that	 political	 parties	 are	
decisive	in	cueing	the	public,	and	the	stronger	their	attachments	to	citizens	and	the	
wider	their	disagreement,	the	easier	is	mobilization	against	European	integration.	
In	 the	 following,	 we	 specify	 the	 dynamics	 and	 mechanisms	 of	 the	 impact	 these	
factors	play	on	Eurosceptic	attitudes.	
	





according	 to	 the	 social	 characteristics	of	 the	 context	 and	 the	process	of	 identity-
building.	 However,	 the	 nature	 and	 origin	 of	 partisanship	 is	 controversial.	While	
sociological	 theories	emphasize	that	party	attachments	are	rooted	on	deep	social	
cleavages	 (Lipset	 and	 Rokkan	 1967),	 more	 ‘rational’	 approaches	 argue	 that	
partisanship	 is	a	by-product	of	short-term	preferences,	a	 ‘functional’	device	used	
by	 citizens	 to	 orientate	 their	 preferences	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 issue	 preferences	 or	
performance	 evaluations	 (Bartle	 and	 Bellucci	 2008).	While	 the	 first	 perspective	
highlights	the	stability	of	partisanship	and	the	constraints	on	individuals’	attitudes,	
according	 to	 the	 revisionist	 theory	partisan	 identities	oscillates	 significantly	 as	 a	
reflection	 of	 weaker	 linkages	 between	 citizens	 and	 parties.	 Some	 studies	 have	




Regardless	 of	 the	 approaches	 adopted	 to	 explain	 the	 nature	 of	 partisan	
attachments,	 we	 claim,	 following	 Steenbergen	 et	 al.	 (2007),	 that	 mass-elite	
linkages	 have	 a	 reciprocal	 nature	 and	 their	 position	 towards	 the	 EU	 is	 a	 dual	
process,	 whereby	 party	 elites	 both	 respond	 to	 and	 shape	 the	 views	 of	 their	
supporters.	 Therefore,	 our	 first	 hypothesis	 is	 that	 the	 stronger	 the	 degree	 of	




the	 left-right	 divide,	 is	 that	 the	more	divided	 a	 country’s	 elite,	 the	more	 citizens	
mobilize	against	European	integration.	Previous	studies	on	the	politicization	of	the	
European	issues	have	found	that	there	is	nothing	deterministic	 in	the	way	public	
opinion	 frames	 the	European	 integration	 (Hooghe	and	Marks	2004).	 In	 addition,	
Ray	(2003)	found	that	top-down	effects	are	more	prominent	if	there	is	inter-party	
dissent,	 that	 is,	when	the	distance	between	parties	 is	significant.	This	means	that	











European’	 region	 in	 the	 Union	 (Hooghe	 and	 Marks	 2007).	 Its	 publics	 were	
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regarded	 as	 ‘among	 the	 most	 euro-enthusiast’	 in	 Europe	 (Llamazares	 and	
Gramacho	 2007,	 p.	 212).	 In	 political	 debates	 within	 South	 European	 societies,	
there	 was	 a	 tendency	 to	 link	 European	 integration	 not	 only	 with	 economic	
prosperity	 and	 high	 levels	 of	 transfers	 from	 the	 EU	 budget,	 meaning	 that	 the	
European	project	enjoyed	high	output	 legitimacy	 (Verney	2017,	p.	169),	but	also	
with	 democratic	 consolidation	 and	 good	 governance	 as	 the	 prospect	 of	
membership	 in	 the	 EU	 has	 been	 one	 of	 the	 driving	 forces	 of	 democratic	
consolidation	 for	 Southern	 European	 countries.	 Traditionally	 the	 main	 political	
parties	have	supported	the	process	of	European	integration,	and	there	has	been	a	
high	 level	of	 consensus	among	 the	main	political	actors	about	 the	need	 to	play	a	
positive	role	in	the	European	context	(Verney	2011).		
	
This	has	also	 led	 this	 issue	 to	a	marginal	position	 in	 the	public	debate	and	party	
competition,	as	 the	salience	of	EU	 integration	has	remained	quite	 low	during	 the	
democratic	 period.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 opposition	 to	 EU	 was	 largely	 a	 leftist	
phenomenon.	In	other	words,	one	specificity	of	Southern	European	countries	is	the	
relative	 absence	 of	 a	 legacy	 of	 right-wing	 Euroscepticism.	 However,	 it	 is	 worth	
noting	the	emergence	of	eurosceptic	stances	also	among	some	rightist	forces	since	
the	1990s,	with	the	notable	cases	of	Greece	(Laos)	and	Italy	(Northern	League).	All	
in	 all,	 as	 a	 general	 rule	 the	 main	 eurosceptic	 actors	 in	 Southern	 Europe	 were	
located	 in	 a	 marginal	 position	 towards	 the	 left	 end	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum	
(Verney	2011).	
	
Yet,	 the	 economic	 and	 financial	 crisis	 has	 significantly	 changed	 this	 situation,	
putting	 an	 end	 to	 the	 overwhelmingly	 pro-European	 orientation	 of	 publics	 and	
political	 forces	 in	the	region.	The	crisis	has	reshaped	the	way	in	which	European	








the	 country	worst	 affected	 by	 the	 crisis,	 the	 austerity	measures	 attached	 to	 the	




fuels	 the	 pool	 of	 nationalist	 and	 anti-European	 sentiment	 in	 the	 country	 but,	 in	
extreme	 cases,	 also	 gave	 rise	 to	 a	 narrative	 that	 presented	 the	 EU	 as	 a	 form	 of	
German-led	foreign	occupation	reminiscent	of	the	Nazis	(Teperoglou	and	Tsatsanis	
2014,	 p.	 227;	 Michailidou	 2016).	 Therefore,	 it	 has	 been	 noted	 that,	 across	 the	
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region,	the	linkage	between	austerity	policies	and	the	EU	have	fostered	not	only	a	






Even	 though	 the	 levels	 of	 Euroscepticism	 in	 Southern	 Europe	 have	 increased	
overall	 beyond	 any	 doubt	 (Verney	 2017),	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 patterns	 of	
Euroscepticism	deviate	 from	 the	wider	European	pattern	 carry	 to	 a	 large	 extent	
the	legacy	of	the	party	system	of	the	period	prior	to	the	onset	of	the	crisis.	As	we	
see	 in	 Figure	 1,	 only	 Italy	 mirrors	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 the	 pattern	 of	 mass-level	
Euroscepticism	 across	 the	 left-right	 spectrum	 that	we	 observe	when	we	 use	 the	
entire	sample	from	the	15	European	countries	(the	predicted	values	are	obtained	
through	a	multilevel	 regression	analysis	of	 the	15	national	 samples).	Greece	and	
Portugal	deviate	from	the	European	pattern,	projecting	a	mostly	leftist	Eurosceptic	
profile,	 even	 though	 in	 Greece	 there	 are	 signs	 of	 more	 fully	 realized	 U-shaped	
interaction	 between	 Euroscepticism	 and	 left-right	 ideology	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	
electorate.	In	Spain,	conversely,	the	pattern	is	completely	reversed.		Spain	projects	
the	 lowest	 levels	of	Euroscepticism	 than	any	Southern	European	 country	and	an	




Our	contention	 is	 that	 the	deviations	 from	the	European	pattern	have	a	 lot	 to	do	
with	the	interaction	between	the	party	legacies	in	each	country,	the	advent	of	new	
(mostly	 but	 not	 exclusively)	 Eurosceptic	 parties,	 and	 the	 filter	 of	 partisanship	
towards	 both	 older	 and	 newer	 parties	 at	 the	 individual	 level	 that	 mediate	 the	
impact	 of	 ideology	 on	 Eurosceptic	 attitudes.	 With	 the	 exception	 of	 Portugal,	
Southern	European	countries	have	seen	a	sharp	rise	 in	 the	electoral	relevance	of	
Eurosceptic	parties.	In	Italy	the	success	of	the	5	Star	Movement	(M5S)	in	the	2013	
elections	 has	 considerably	 reshaped	 the	 format	 and	 dynamic	 of	 the	whole	 party	
system	 (Tronconi	 2015).	 In	 Greece	 Euroscepticism	 has	 assumed	 a	 primary	
importance	on	the	domestic	political	scene	and	contributed	to	the	emergence	of	a	
new	political	 cleavage	 around	 the	 issue	 of	 the	EU/IMF	bailouts	 (Teperoglou	 and	




Therefore	 our	 expectation	 is	 that	 partisanship	 will	 mediate	 the	 relationship	 of	
(left-right)	 ideology	with	 Euroscepticism	within	 each	 country	 (H3),	 a	 hypothesis	
that	constitutes	a	variation	of	H1.	Partisanship	for	Eurosceptic	old	and	new	parties	
such	as	KKE,	Podemos,	BE	and	CDU	(on	 the	 left)	or	LN	and	Golden	Dawn	on	 the	
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right	will	tend	to	boost	the	association	between	left	and	right	ideology	respectively	
with	 Eurosceptic	 attitudes	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 attitudes	 towards	 Europe	 of	






To	 test	 the	 aforementioned	hypotheses,	we	use	data	 from	 two	different	 sources.	
The	 Chapel	 Hill	 dataset	 offers	 information	 on	 party	 positions	 over	 time	 for	 all	
European	 countries	 (Bakker	 et	 al.	 2014).	 The	 database	 provides	 a	 nuanced	
measurement	of	party	orientations	towards	a	wide	range	of	dimensions	related	to	
the	 process	 of	 European	 integration.	 For	 our	 analysis,	 we	 rely	 on	 the	 question	
about	orientation	towards	European	integration,	that	 in	our	opinion	corresponds	
well	to	the	classic	question	fielded	in	European	comparative	mass-level	surveys	on	
whether	European	 integration	should	be	pushed	 further	or	 if	 it	has	already	gone	




As	the	paper	 focuses	on	how	party	system	features	 impact	Euroscepticism	at	 the	
individual	 level,	we	use	 several	 variables	at	 the	macro	 level.	The	 first	variable	 is	
party	 system	polarization,	which	 is	 based	 on	Dalton’s	 (2008)	 operationalization.		
We	use	data	exclusively	from	2014	relying	on	calculations	that	are	available	on	the	
ParlGov	website	 (Döring	and	Manow	2015).	The	 second	 set	of	 variables	 are	 two	
indicators	 that	 capture	 party	 system	Euroscepticism	 at	 the	 two	 ends	 of	 the	 left-
right	ideological	spectrum.	The	two	indices	are	constructed	by	taking	party	scores	
reported	 in	 the	CHES	dataset,	weighted	according	 to	 their	electoral	 size	across	4	
time	points	that	capture	a	period	from	2002	to	2014.	We	chose	a	more	diachronic	
approach	 to	 measure	 party	 system	 Euroscepticism	 as	 our	 goal	 was	 to	 capture	
primarily	 the	 legacy	 of	 party	 system	 Euroscepticism	 and	 not	 just	 rely	 on	 a	
snapshot.	 Our	 contention	 is	 that	 the	 influence	 of	 parties	 on	 citizens	 on	 core	
dimensions	 of	 competition	 builds	 up	 slowly	 across	 time	 and	 does	 not	 easily	
fluctuate	from	one	political	cycle	to	the	next.		
	












4 	if	LR	party	position	 ≥ 7	
	
where	y	 corresponds	 to	 one	of	 the	 four	points	 in	 time	used	 in	 the	CHES	dataset	
(2002,	2006,	2010	and	2014),	 	𝑛	 is	 the	number	of	parties	whose	position	on	 the	
left-right	 axis	 according	 to	CHES	data	 is	 equal	or	 less	 than	3	 (for	 left-wing	party	
system	 Euroscepticism)	 or	 equal	 or	 more	 than	 7	 (for	 right-wing	 party	 system	
Euroscepticism)	 in	 time	point	y,	𝑝+ 	 is	 the	 electoral	 share	of	 party	 𝑗,	 and	𝑒+ 	 is	 the	




2014	 in	each	of	 the	EU’s	27	member	states	 (Schmitt	et	al.	2016).	Our	dependent	
variable	 is	 based	 on	 the	 question	 regarding	 support	 to	 further	 European	 Union	
integration,	 recoded	 in	 a	 way	 that	 higher	 values	 reflect	 opposition	 to	 further	
integration.	The	dataset	also	includes	some	key	variables	that	can	be	added	to	our	
statistical	 model	 as	 independent	 variable.	 First,	 we	 test	 the	 effect	 for	 political	
ideology,	measured	by	self-placement	on	a	11-point	scale	ranging	from	left	to	right.	
Second,	 we	 also	 test	 the	 impact	 of	 party	 identification	 measured	 as	 a	 dummy	




multilevel	 regression	 analysis	 that	 includes	 country-level	 fixed	 effects	 using	
attitudes	 towards	 European	 integration	 as	 our	 dependent	 variable.	 Besides	
individual	and	structural-level	 independent	variables,	we	also	 include	 interaction	
terms	between	the	two	levels,	namely	between	partisan	attachments	and	ideology,	
on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 party	 system	 Euroscepticism,	 on	 the	 other,	 including	 all	










Table	 1	 shows	 the	 model	 that	 tests	 whether	 our	 key	 indicators	 that	 measure	
individual	 and	 macro-level	 characteristics	 impact	 the	 degree	 of	 Euroscepticism.	
First,	we	 see	 that	 left	 ideology	 is	negatively	associated	and	 that	 right	 ideology	 is	
positively	associated	with	Euroscepticism	in	Europe,	a	pattern	that	is	the	opposite	
of	what	happens	 in	Southern	Europe	with	 the	exception	of	 Italy.	 	 Left	 and	 right-
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wing	party	 system	Euroscepticism	are	 positively	 associated	with	Euroscepticism	
(as	expected)	but	their	direct	effects	are	non-significant.	However,	in	terms	of	the	
interaction	 between	 partisanship	 and	 ideology,	 we	 see	 that	 H1	 is	 confirmed	 for	
respondents	that	are	located	at	the	right	part	of	the	spectrum.	The	impact	of	right-
wing	 ideology	on	Eurosceptic	attitudes	 is	positive	and	significant	 for	partisans	 in	
party	 systems	 that	 are	 marked	 by	 high	 levels	 of	 right-wing	 Euroscepticism,	
whereas	 the	 relationship	 is	 the	 inverse	 for	 non-partisans.	 For	 left-wingers,	 the	
influence	of	 left-wing	party	system	Euroscepticism	appears	to	be	similar	for	both	
partisans	 and	 non-partisans	 contrary	 to	 H1.	 Although	 more	 sophisticated	
techniques	 are	 needed	 in	 order	 to	 disentangle	 the	 mechanisms	 behind	 it,	 our	








Moving	on	 to	 the	 impact	of	party	system	polarization	on	Eurosceptic	attitudes,	a	
first	interesting	and	counterintuitive	finding	is	that	polarization	appears	to	have	a	
negative	 direct	 effect	 on	 Eurosceptic	 attitudes.	 However,	 when	 looking	 at	 the	






impact	 on	Eurosceptic	 attitudes.	 The	hypothesis	 that	 higher	 levels	 of	 inter-party	
dissent	 (i.e.	 polarization)	 strengthens	 the	 applicability	 of	 left/right	 ideology	 for	
explaining	 EU	 policy	 positions	 (H2)	 is	 mostly	 supported	 by	 the	 data.	 The	 main	
implication	is	that	parties	can	also	indirectly	politicize	and	polarize	the	electorate	
on	 the	 issue	of	Europe	even	 if	 they	adopt	more	polarizing	positions	on	 the	main	
(but	 potentially	 unrelated)	 axis	 of	 competition,	 namely	 the	 left/right	 axis.	 This	
“top-down	effect”	operates	through	the	influence	of	partisanship	and	can	be	seen	







most	 cases	 that	 the	 influence	 of	 partisanship	 mediates	 to	 varying	 extent	 the	
relationship	 between	 left-right	 ideology	 and	 Eurosceptic	 attitudes	 (see	 Figure	 4;	
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In	 Spain	 a	 similar	 problem	 as	 in	 Portugal	 is	 the	 absence	 of	 identifiers	 with	
Izquierda	Unida	(IU)	in	the	dataset,	which	limits	us	to	a	comparison	of	identifiers	
with	 the	 socialist	 party	 (PSOE)	 and	 with	 the	 new	 party	 Podemos.	 However,	 the	
results	portray	a	similar	picture,	with	partisans	of	the	more	Eurosceptic	Podemos	
more	 likely	 to	 hold	 Eurosceptic	 attitudes	 across	 the	 left-to-center	 ideological	
spectrum	in	relation	to	their	PSOE	counterparts.	On	the	right	side	of	the	political	
spectrum	 we	 also	 witness	 the	 mediating	 effect	 of	 identification	 with	 the	 pro-






European	 one	more	 closely	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 region,	 the	 influence	 of	
partisanship	 appears	 the	 weakest.	 Partisanship	 seems	 to	 have	 no	 discernible	
effects	 on	 Eurosceptic	 attitudes.	 Respondents	 who	 identify	 with	 the	 center-left	
pro-European	 Partito	 Democratico	 (PD)	 as	 well	 as	 with	 the	 more	 left-wing	 and	








ideological	 spectrum.	 Left-wing	 partisans	 of	 PASOK	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 hold	
Eurosceptic	attitudes	than	partisans	of	the	soft-Eurosceptic	SYRIZA	and	much	less	
likely	 than	 partisans	 of	 the	 hard-Eurosceptic	 Greek	 Communist	 Party	 (KKE).	 On	
	 15	
the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 spectrum,	 partisans	 of	 the	 pro-European	 center-right	 are	
increasingly	 less	 likely	 (the	 more	 one	 moves	 towards	 the	 right	 end	 of	 the	
spectrum)	to	hold	Eurosceptic	attitudes	than	identifiers	with	the	hard-Eurosceptic	








with	 specific	 reference	 to	 Western	 European	 countries.	 In	 doing	 so,	 we	 have	





of	 how	 the	 different	 configuration	 and	 characteristics	 of	 party	 systems	 have	
affected	Eurosceptic	stances.	In	particular,	we	tested	the	impact	of	polarization	and	
we	 found	 support	 for	 our	 argument	 that	 the	 ideological	 distance	 interacts	
significantly	with	 ideology,	 increasing	 or	 decreasing	 the	 level	 of	 Euroscepticism.	
Political	 legacies,	 in	 particular	 overall	 levels	 of	 left	 and	 right-wing	 party	
euroscpeticism	also	shape	individual	attitudes	on	European	integration.	
	
The	 second	 original	 contribution	 of	 this	 paper	 refers	 to	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	
distinct	trajectories	of	Euroscepticism	in	Western	Europe.	The	analysis	shows	that	
even	Southern	European	countries	have	followed	distinct	patterns	of	Eurosceptic	













Despite	 these	 limitations,	 these	 findings	 have	 interesting	 implications	 for	 1)	
research	on	public	opinion	support	regarding	the	process	of	European	integration	





elite	 linkage.	 Political	 parties	 have	 a	 role	 to	 play	 in	 this	 process	 by	 formulating	
clear	 positions,	 communicating	 their	 stances	 to	 voters	 and	 to	 build	 efficient	
connections	to	voters	through	elections	(e.g.	 through	ideological	congruence).	On	
the	 other,	 we	 believe	 these	 findings	 also	 bear	 implications	 for	 understanding	
future	 developments	 of	 Euroscepticism	 in	Western	Europe	 and	 its	 impact	 in	 the	
transformation	 of	 party	 competition.	 The	 growing	 level	 of	 polarization	
experienced	 during	 the	 crisis	 is	 likely	 to	 foster	 not	 only	 a	 higher	 salience	 of	
European	matters,	but	also	the	politicization	of	this	(relatively	new)	dimension	of	
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Tables	and	Figures	
	
	
Table	1.	Multilevel	explanatory	models	of	Euroscepticism	
Fixed	effects	
	 Baseline	 With	Interactions	
	 		B	(s.e.)	 		B	(s.e.)	
Intercept	 	6.76	(.378)***	 	6.92	(.336)***	
Gender	(Female=1)	 	.049	(.093)	 .048	(.092)	
Age	 	.443	(.244)*	 .429	(.235)*	
Education	 -1.21	(.337)***	 -1.23	(.314)***	
Social	staircase	(self-placement)	 -.694	(.155)***	 -.720	(.149)***	
Ref=Center	(4-6	self-placement)	 	 	
Left	(0-3	self-placement)	 -.334	(.080)***	 -.352	(.143)**	
Right	(7-10	self-placement)	 	.533	(.225)**	 -.065	(.259)	
Party	identification	 -.148	(.135)	 -.306	(.135)**	
Party	system	Left	euroscepticism	 	.162	(.153)	 	.144	(.266)	
Party	system	Right	euroscepticism	 	.170	(.218)	 .185	(.166)	
Party	system	polarization	 -8.80	(4.13)**	 -9.87	(4.99)**	
Left*Party_Id	 	 	.082	(.169)	
Right*Party_Id	 	 	.712	(.284)**	
Party_Id*	Left_Party_System_Eurosc	 	 	.000	(.114)	
Left*	Left_Party_System_Eurosc	 	 	.358	(.138)***	
Party_Id*	Right_Party_System_Eurosc	 	 -.070	(.093)	
Right*	Right_Party_System_Eurosc	 	 -.277	(.218)	
Party_Id*	Polarization	 	 	1.65	(2.30)	
Left*Polarization	 	 -.512	(4.24)	
Right*Polarization	 	 -7.58	(8.74)	
Left*Party_Id*Polarization	 	 	4.17	(3.60)	
Right*Party_Id*Polarization	 	 	9.39	(7.69)	
Left*Party_Id*Left_Party_System_Eurosc	 	 -.284	(.134)**	
Right*Party_Id*Left_Party_System_Euro
sc	
	 	.548	(.217)**	
Random-effect	parameters:	Country	level	
Variance	(intercept)	 	.420	(.174)	 	.383	(.173)	
Variance	(Party	id)	 	.143	(.074)	 	.090	(.062)	
Covariance	 -.057	(.077)	 -.003	(.062)	
N	(individuals)	 11866	
N	(countries)	 15	
Note:	∗p<0.10,	∗∗p	<	0.05,	∗∗∗p	<	0.01.	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
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Figure	1.	Euroscepticism	by	Left-Right	Ideology	in	Portugal,	Spain,	Italy	and	
Greece	and	15	European	countries	in	2014	
	
	
	
	
Data:	European	Election	Study	2014	
Note:	Lines	represent	fitted	values;	shaded	areas	represent	95%	confidence	intervals	
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Figure	2.	Marginal	Effects	of	Left	and	Right	Ideology	on	Individual-level	
Euroscepticism	by	Party	System	Left-Wing	and	Right-Wing	Euroscepticism	
	
	
	
Data:	European	Election	Study	2014	
Note:	Shaded	areas	represent	95%	confidence	intervals	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	3.	Marginal	Effects	of	Left	and	Right	Ideology	on	Individual-level	
Euroscepticism	by	Party	System	Polarization	
	
	
	
Data:	European	Election	Study	2014	
Note:	Shaded	areas	represent	95%	confidence	intervals	
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Figure	4.	Marginal	effects	of	party	identification	on	Euroscepticism	by	party	and	
Left-Right	Ideology	in	Portugal,	Spain,	Italy,	and	Greece,	2014	
	 	
	
	
	
Data:	European	Election	Study	2014	
Note:	Shaded	areas	and	dashed	lines	represent	95%	confidence	intervals	
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Appendix	
	
Table	A1.	Explanatory	model	of	Euroscepticism,	Portugal	2014	
	 Baseline	 With	interactions	
Variable	 B	(s.e.)	 		B	(s.e.)	
Intercept	 	5.82	(.482)***	 	6.36	(.477)***	
Gender	(Female=1)	 	.563	(.204)***	 	.546	(.203)***	
Age	 	.590	(.364)	 	.571	(.357)	
Education	 -.230	(.444)	 -.260	(.432)	
Left-Right	self-placement	 -.189	(.057)***	 -.310	(.068)***	
PSD	party	identification	 -.401	(.340)	 -4.84	(1.17)***	
PS	party	identification	 -.368	(.222)*	 -1.47	(.606)**	
BE	party	identification	 	1.00	(.588)*	 	.382	(1.01)	
PSD_Id*Left-Right	 	 	.691	(.185)***	
PS_Id*Left-Right	 	 	.271	(.135)**	
BE_Id*Left-Right	 	 	.183	(.267)	
R2	 	.060	 	.086	
N	 696	
Data:	European	Election	Study	2014	
Note:	∗p<0.10,	∗∗p	<	0.05,	∗∗∗p	<	0.01.	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
	
	
	
	
Table	A2.	Explanatory	model	of	Euroscepticism,	Spain	2014	
	 Baseline	 With	interactions	
Variable	 B	(s.e.)	 		B	(s.e.)	
Intercept	 	5.06	(.524)***	 	5.20	(.553)***	
Gender	(Female=1)	 	.236	(.193)	 	.255	(.192)	
Age	 -.318	(.368)	 -.293	(.370)	
Education	 -1.39	(.417)***	 -1.38	(.420)***	
Left-Right	self-placement	 	.086	(.057)	 	.046	(.072)	
PP	party	identification	 -.443	(.347)	 	.700	(1.34)	
PSOE	party	identification	 -.334	(.304)	 -1.20	(.578)**	
Podemos	party	identification	 	.507	(.332)	 	.188	(.622)	
PP_Id*Left-Right	 	 -.147	(.193)	
PSOE_Id*Left-Right	 	 	.303	(.162)**	
Podemos_Id*Left-Right	 	 	.102	(.181)	
R2	 	.024	 	.031	
N	 879	
Data:	European	Election	Study	2014	
Note:	∗p<0.10,	∗∗p	<	0.05,	∗∗∗p	<	0.01.	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
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Table	A3.	Explanatory	model	of	Euroscepticism,	Italy	2014	
	 Baseline	 With	interactions	
Variable	 B	(s.e.)	 		B	(s.e.)	
Intercept	 	5.61	(.519)***	 	5.55	(.600)***	
Gender	(Female=1)	 	.209	(.201)	 	.208	(.201)	
Age	 	.256	(.361)	 	.255	(.362)	
Education	 			-.116	(.427)	 			-.102	(.427)	
Left-Right	self-placement	 	.004	(.056)	 	.015	(.079)	
PD	party	identification	 -.875	(.235)***	 -.807	(.544)	
FI	party	identification	 -.072	(.373)	 -.055	(1.28)	
LN	party	identification	 	.447	(.482)	 	3.13	(3.17)	
SEL	party	identification	 -1.41	(.700)**	 -2.58	(1.60)	
PD_Id*Left-Right	 	 -.014	(.122)	
FI_Id*Left-Right	 	 -.006	(.183)	
LN_Id*Left-Right	 	 -.370	(.460)	
SEL_Id*Left-Right	 	 	.517	(.575)	
R2	 	.031	 	.033	
N	 743	
Data:	European	Election	Study	2014	
Note:	∗p<0.10,	∗∗p	<	0.05,	∗∗∗p	<	0.01.	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
	
	
	
Table	A4.	Explanatory	model	of	Euroscepticism,	Greece	2014	
	 Baseline	 With	interactions	
Variable	 B	(s.e.)	 		B	(s.e.)	
Intercept	 	.401	(.587)	 	.331	(.697)	
Gender	(Female=1)	 	.077	(.199)	 	.060	(.197)	
Age	 	.099	(.367)	 	.093	(.364)	
Education	 			-.602	(.424)	 			-.632	(.423)	
Left-Right	self-placement	 -.007	(.064)	 	.013	(.099)	
KKE	party	identification	 	1.98	(.515)***	 	3.06	(.832)***	
SYRIZA	party	identification	 -.051	(.280)	 	.154	(.761)	
PASOK	party	identification	 -1.33	(.425)***	 -2.13	(1.55)	
ND	party	identification	 -.872	(.304)***	 	1.21	(1.15)	
ANEL	party	identification	 -.074	(.717)	 	1.14	(3.04)	
GD	party	identification	 	.987	(.501)**	 -2.53	(1.57)	
KKE_Id*Left-Right	 	 -.582	(.310)*	
SYRIZA_Id*Left-Right	 	 -.049	(.168)	
PASOK_Id*Left-Right	 	 	.169	(.308)	
ND_Id*Left-Right	 	 -.293	(.170)	
ANEL_Id*Left-Right	 	 -.208	(.510)	
GD_Id*Left-Right	 	 	.471	(.211)**	
R2	 .057	 	.076	
N	 866	
Data:	European	Election	Study	2014	
Note:	∗p<0.10,	∗∗p	<	0.05,	∗∗∗p	<	0.01.	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
	
